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Abstract
Is there a rational component in the decision to commit suicide? Economists
have been trying to shed light on this question by studying whether suicide
rates are related to contemporaneous conditions. This paper goes one step
further: we test whether suicides are linked to forward-looking behavior. In
Italy, collective sentence reductions (pardons) often lead to massive releases of
prisoners. More importantly, they are usually preceded by prolonged parlia-
mentary activity (legislative proposals, discussion, voting, etc.) that inmates
seem to follow closely. We use the legislative proposals for collective pardons
to measure changes in the inmates’ expectations about the length of their
sentences, and find that suicide rates tend to be significantly lower when par-
dons are proposed in congress. This suggests that, amongst inmates in Italian
prisons, the average decision to commit suicide responds to changes in cur-
rent expectations about future conditions. At least partially, therefore, the
decision seems rationalizable.
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1 Introduction
According to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in 2011 suicides
were the 10th leading cause of death across all age groups, and the second cause
of death between the age of 15 and 34; with an estimated medical and work loss
that is close to $ 35 billion a year. Based on the last Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration survey in the United States alone about 8 million
adults had suicidal thoughts in 2008, and about 1 million attempted suicide (one in
25 attempts is successful).
For a long time now, applied economists but also policy makers have been trying
to establish whether incentives and changes at the margin of the kind typically
addressed in economic analysis do matter even when the underlying decision-making
scenario is as extreme and the choice itself as irreversible as for suicides.
More precisely, when economic theory considers the rationality of the decision
to commit suicide it predicts that individuals decide to do so when their discounted
expected lifetime utility falls below a certain threshold. The evolution of the un-
derlying theoretical framework has ranged from simple comparisons of net present
values (see Hamermesh and Soss, 1974, for a seminal work) to elaborate models in
which the irreversibility of the act generates an option value to waiting (i.e., postpon-
ing suicide) when the uncertainty about the future is high (see Dixit and Pindyck,
1994).
And there have been of course several attempts to test these theories empirically,
or at least whether suicides respond to economic incentives (see Goldsmith et al.
(2002) for a wide and comprehensive overview of the literature on suicides, and
Chen et al. (2009) for a thorough survey of the empirical literature). One approach
(see, for example, Koo and Cox, 2008) has been to argue that human capital depre-
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ciation, as a consequence of unemployment and lack of job training, undoubtedly
worsens an individual’s prospects for the future. Suicide might become then an
acceptable option if one’s myopic considerations limit the decision-making foresight
to within the horizon of current hardship. Another approach, adopted by the grand
majority of the literature in question, has been to look for correlations between sui-
cides and current socioeconomic factors - such as income, income growth, education,
unemployment, gender, race, monetary incentives (insurance), health, religion, so-
cial capital, and other cultural parameters. Typically, the data are aggregated over
time and space, and a positive correlation between suicides and adverse economic
conditions emerges (see for instance Ruhm (2000), Cutler et al. (2001), Brainerd
(2001), or Andres (2005)).
Instead, a set of recent papers use individual level data on suicides. Daly and Wilson
(2009) finds that the suicides and subjective measures of wellbeing share the same
socioeconomic determinants. Similar to our approach, Daly et al. (2013) model sui-
cides as choice variable that depends on the expected present and future utility. The
authors find that the likelihood of suicide decreases with own income and increases
with the reference-group income, highlighting the importance of relative statuses
(see also the related paper Daly et al., 2011).
In either approach, however, the focus is on contemporaneous correlations, which
makes the identification of a causal relationship between the socioeconomic variables
and the suicide rate more difficult. Even though the respective results might be
capturing, at least to some degree, the forward-looking behavior of the underlying
theoretical framework, they cannot rule out reverse causality. The latter issue could
well be at play for instance if on average individuals who suffer from (unobserved)
mental disorders tend to be also less productive. By contrast, the present paper
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does not attempt to test the existence of a rationalizable component of suicides
using measures of current economic conditions. Instead, our identification strategy
rests on changes in current expectations about future conditions, brought about by
new information that renders certain future changes more probable, that do not
alter the one’s current wellbeing.
In particular, we test whether new information about the future can influence the
decision to commit suicide in a rather peculiar environment: Italian prisons. Given
that individual expectations are both hard to measure and highly diverse, prisons
and suicides in prisons represent almost ideal experimental grounds and events,
respectively. As the environment in which the experiment takes place, prisons are
closed and isolated - which reduces the influence of external factors that might be
latent or hard to measure (family, friends, career prospects, current socioeconomic
conditions, etc.). As events, suicides in prisons are fully recorded while changes in
the typical underlying individual expected utility depend almost exclusively upon
changes in one’s expected length of sentence.1
Needless to say, new information about future conditions may reflect “good”
or “bad” news. Previous research has shown that bad news might indeed lead
to extreme self-harming behavior. In order to prevent suicides, criminologists and
psychologists have tried to build the typical profile of suicides in prison. Despite lack
of data and small sample issues (Liebling, 1995, 1999) this research has concluded,
among other things, that a period of risk for pretrial inmates is around the time of
a court appearance, especially when a guilty verdict and harsh sentencing may be
anticipated. For sentenced prisoners, on the other hand, triggers for suicide are to
1Other things being equal, expectations about one’s length of sentence come into play because,
as in the typical prison system, Italian prisons hold also inmates awaiting trial. For the already
sentenced criminals, on the other hand, it is the length of sentence that really matters since “an
inmate’s dream is to fall asleep one day and wake up half a year later” (Kaminski, 2004).
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be found in negative legal dispositions, such as loss of an appeal or the denial of
parole (Wicks, 1972, Hayes, 1995, WHO, 2000).
Our focus in the present paper will be instead on “good” news. In Italy, collec-
tive sentence reductions (pardons) often lead to massive releases of prisoners. More
importantly, they are usually preceded by prolonged parliamentary activity (leg-
islative proposals, discussion, voting in subcommittees, etc.) that inmates seem to
follow closely.2
Our contribution is to use legislative proposals for collective pardons to measure
changes in the inmates’ expectations about the length of their sentences, and to
show that suicide rates tend to be significantly lower when pardons are proposed
in congress. Our findings indicate that, amongst inmates in Italian prisons, the
average decision to commit suicide does depend upon current expectations about
future conditions. This necessitates of course that the underlying decision-making
process has at a minimum some component which does respond to informational
incentives and which can be thus rationalized.3
We also find that not all proposals carry the same signal. In particular, proposals
presented by congressman with a history of unsuccessful proposals (more than two)
do not induce any changes in suicides. Similarly, proposals presented in the future,
that thus are not yet known by the inmates, do not induce any behavioral change
(this finding also alleviates concerns about reverse causality).
2Unfortunately in this context we cannot study “bad news,” as proposals that are expected to
be unsuccessful are not even put to vote but rather kept on hold indefinitely.
3It should be noted here that our findings do not by any means render the decision to commit
suicide rational per se. They do point out, however, that some of its constituting components may
be rational. As an assertion, this has been made before in the literature but in decision-making
contexts that differ sharply from the one under consideration here. See DellaVigna (2009) for an
overview of decision-making situations that reflect potential departures from perfect rationality yet
in which the agents do respond to informational incentives. See also Drago et al. (2009) as well
as Barbarino and Mastrobuoni (2014) for another use of collective pardons as a policy instrument:
to identify deterrence and incapacitation, respectively.
5
The balance of the paper is structured as follows. Sections 2-3 describe the
policy instrument and the decision-making situation under investigation. Section 4
presents the data and the empirical analysis while Section 6 concludes.
2 Collective Pardons
The policy instrument we will use to measure changes in the current prisoners’ ex-
pectations about their future conditions are legislative proposals in the Italian Par-
liament for collective pardons (Amnistie e Indulti). These are non-discriminatory
sentence reductions, typically by 2-3 years, for crimes committed before the law gets
passed, and lead to the immediate release of all inmates whose remaining sentence
is less than the reduction itself. For a collective pardon to become Italian law,
it has to be proposed first by a member of the Parliament and then assigned to
a Parliamentary Commission (Commissione Parlamentare). From there, once the
proposal has been discussed and appropriately prepared, it is sent to the parliamen-
tary chamber that currently sets the agenda. And to be approved, the proposal has
to be voted without further changes in both Chambers of Parliament, the Camera
dei Deputati and the Senato della Repubblica, by an absolute majority of two-thirds
(Constitutional Law 6/1992).4
Of course, collective pardons in Italy have not been part of any systematic prison
reform. In the recent past especially, they rather represent isolated and ad-hoc at-
tempts to address pressing problems of prison overcrowding.5 In this sense, legisla-
4Before 1992, a simple legislative majority sufficed for collective amnesties and pardons to
become Italian law. It should be pointed out also that collective pardon proposals can be made in
addition by the government, the regional councils (Consigli Regionali), and the citizens themselves
(as long as at least 50,000 signatures are collected so as to constitute an Iniziativa legislativa
Popolare). More often than not, however, and in line with most legislative proposals in Italy, they
are initiated in the Parliament.
5To give a historical perspective, between the unification of Italy in 1865 and Mussolini’s defeat
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tive proposals for collective pardons reflect by themselves good news for people that
are behind bars. For they are not only necessary for an amnesty law to be passed,
but their very number is correlated with the likelihood that this happens.
This is depicted vividly in Figure 1 with respect to the period between 1980 and
2011: shortly before the amnesty law gets passed (an event shown by a vertical line
in the figure), the number of proposals for such a law increases dramatically.6 More
specifically, between January 1980 and June 2011, the introduction of at least one
pardon proposal in the Italian Parliament in a given month increases the likelihood
that in the following month an amnesty law is passed from less than 1 percent
to 3.7 percent (at the 10 percent level of significance). In fact, each proposal by
itself increases the likelihood in question by 1.3 percentage points (at the 1 percent
significance level).7
Equally importantly perhaps for the purposes of our study, pardon proposals are
noisy signals of parliamentary activity on collective pardons as they do not make it
into a law all the time. In June and July 2000, the year of the Great Jubilee, Pope
John Paul II asked policy makers to pardon inmates while visiting the Roman prison
of Regina Coeli, one of the largest in the country. This led to a surge in pardon
proposals. Nevertheless, no actual law was passed and, in November 2002, the Pope
went to visit the Italian Parliament, asking again for a pardon. This led to a second
surge in proposals - in fact, given how easy it was to predict the Pope’s request,
in 1943, there have been approximately 200 pardons or amnesties. Some of these were fiscal pardons
or amnesties for very specific crimes. Others were aimed at easing social tensions or magnifying
the royal family. Between 1945 and the present, on the other hand, approximately a dozen of
collective clemency acts have been passed. Initially, they were aimed at reconciling a politically-
divided nation. More recently, however, the main goal has been to alleviate severe overcrowding
in prisons.
6For example, the number of pardon proposals in the sample peaks at 7 and 14 in June and
July 2006, respectively, anticipating the amnesty law of August 2006.
7To avoid our exposition being unnecessarily lengthy, the full regressions results have been
omitted from the present version of the paper. They are of course available upon request.
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the surge actually anticipated his visit exhibiting 4, 1, and 6 pardon proposals in
September, October, and November 2002, respectively. However, again no amnesty
law was passed.8
Since pardon proposals will be our measure of “good” news, it is important to
understand how favorable and for whom amongst the Italian prisoners the corre-
sponding event is likely to be. The period under consideration (between January
2002 and June 2011) saw only one amnesty law, on 1 August 2006, and individual-
level data of inmates pardoned on that date shows the average reduction in the
length of their sentence to be 15 months. More impressively perhaps, this means
that on average 45 percent of one’s remaining sentence was pardoned. Figure 2
depicts the relative frequency of the length of the remaining sentence amongst the
Italian prisoners on 1 August 2006, and the fraction of this length that was pardoned
on that date - either variable as a function of one’s total remaining sentence. On
average, an inmate whose total remaining sentence did not exceed 3 years saw it
being reduced by half. Inmates with longer remaining sentences had their sentence
reduced by a smaller fraction; yet, on average this fraction almost never falls be-
low 10 percent while the measure of these cases in the total population decreases
sharply as the remaining sentence length increases. Clearly, based on the August
2006 amnesty law, we may safely assert that pardons induce sizable reductions in
one’s prison time.
Regarding which inmates in particular are likely to receive a sentence reduction,
Table 1 shows the distribution of criminals by crime type, before and after the
August 2006 amnesty law, together with the relative reduction in the corresponding
8Our data on suicides in Italian prisons goes back to only January 2002 and, thus, our study
of the effect of pardon proposals on suicides refers to the period between January 2002 and June
2011.
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prison population. Evidently, the last pardon generated large releases amongst all
types of criminals, with the exception of those imprisoned for mafia-related crimes
(even though other types of crime that comprise a mobster’s sentence may get
pardoned, mafia-related ones never do). In fact, 37 percent of the total population
in Italian prisons were released immediately while, as we have pointed out above,
almost all of the remainder received a substantial sentence reduction, rendering them
eligible to be released quite ahead of their initial schedule.
Of course, there is some uncertainty about receiving a pardon: as a rule, to
prevent abnormal increases in crime just prior to the introduction of an amnesty
law, collective pardons in Italy apply only to crimes committed up to a specific
date, usually three to six months before the date on which the law is signed. As
a result, for those who happen to have committed a crime too close to the latter
date, the pardon is likely to bring nothing but the psychological burden of seeing
their fellow inmates released while they stay behind. This notwithstanding, based
again on the August 2006 amnesty law, many inmates ought to expect to be released
immediately following an amnesty law whereas the vast majority of them ought to
expect a significant anticipation of their release date.
3 Suicides in Prison
The yearly suicide rate in Italian prisons is close to 1/1000. This is about 10 times
(20 times) higher than that amongst the general (male) population, slightly above
the average across the prisons of other European countries, and twice the current
average suicide rate across the U.S. jails. Since the number of inmates fluctuates
around 60,000, there are about 60 suicides per year (i.e., 5 per month) generating a
relatively noisy evolution of suicides.
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At first glance, the relatively high suicide rates in Italian prisons may seem
paradoxical with respect to the claim that the decision to commit suicide might
exhibit a rational component. After all, if being imprisoned is very likely to lead
to the ultimate penalty, a rational agent should have foreseen and avoided this
contingency at all costs, including not becoming a criminal in the first place.
Theoretically, the apparent paradox may be explained by the hypothesis that
criminal behavior reflects the choice to accept a gamble of high returns from crime
against committing suicide if apprehended and convicted (see Becker and Posner
(2004) for a detailed discussion). In more practical terms, it could be driven by
error in the sense that some criminals might not be able to foresee how harsh prison
conditions can be. Of course, this does not mean that medical conditions do not
matter, or that suicides in prison cannot be prevented.9 It does render though
medical conditions as but one of the drivers of suicides in prisons. For an inmate
may well choose to not attempt suicide on the onset of a serious depression, but
rather wait to see what the future brings. More importantly, one should keep in
mind that the goal of our study is to identify a rational component in the decision
to not commit suicide.
In prison, attempted suicides tend to be 10 times more than actual ones. Apart
from committing a successful suicide being not the easiest of tasks, this may reflect
also attempts by inmates to induce their transfer to the hospital, to a different cell, or
even their eventual release (see Kaminski, 2004). Since penitentiary authorities are
aware of this, the attempts themselves need to be credible, which intensifies the risk
of them turning into actual suicides. This notwithstanding, whenever an amnesty
9See, for example, Ludwig et al. (2009) for a recent economic study on anti-depressants and
suicides. For a review of the large literature on the relation between the health status of prisoners
and suicides in prison, which is outside the scope of the present paper, see Fazel and Baillargeon
(2011) and Hayes (1995) among others.
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is deemed to be likely, one should expect a decline even in these “hyper-rational”
suicides.10
4 Data and Preliminary Evidence
Our identification strategy uses detailed information on the timing of (i) actual
suicides in Italian prisons, and (ii) proposals for collective pardons in the Italian
Senate or House of Representatives, over a 10-year period (2002-2011). We obtained
the data on the prison population from the Italian Penitentiary Administration
(DAP) while that on the legislative proposals for collective pardons can be found on
the Italian Senate’s website (www.senato.it). Regarding the exact dates of individual
deaths, our data come from the research group Ristretti Orizzonti (www.ristretti.it)
- unfortunately, it does not include any information about the actual or expected
length of sentence of the respective inmates.11
The summary statistics are shown in Table 2. On average there are more than 4
suicides and about 1.5 natural deaths a month. There is on average a proposal every
two months, and minor parties, minority parties, and congressmen with a history of
pardon proposals tend to present more proposals, which is something we are going
to exploit later.
The parliamentary activity on pardon proposals typically coming in concentrated
waves in our sample, Figure 3 sets the event times to be the months in our sam-
ple in which uninterrupted strings of proposal activity (more precisely, sequences of
consecutive months for which in each and every month at least one pardon proposal
10The term is borrowed from Kaminski (2004), where it is argued that the stakes can be so high
in prison to render even what appears to be inhuman and bizarre behavior “hyper-rational.”
11The same data have been used by Drago et al. (2011) to look at the relationship between
prison conditions (proxied by deaths in prison) and recidivism (see, also, Katz et al., 2003).
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appears in the Italian parliament) come to an end. For a period of four months be-
fore and four months after the event time,12 the average number of pardon proposals
per month (depicted by squares in the figure) is compared to the average number
of suicides per month (depicted by vertical bars in the figure). A local polynomial
regression (depicted by the dashed line in the figure) smooths the monthly averages
to ease the analysis. Suicides in Italian prisons appear to respond to the ongoing
parliamentary activity. More precisely, suicides tend to decrease while pardon pro-
posal activity is being built up in the parliament and increase back again after a few
months when this comes to an end. The number of suicides exhibit a local minimum
around the time a wave of proposals ends.
Pardon proposals are frequent but negative votes on them are extremely rare.
Most proposals that are doomed to be unsuccessful are past the first parliamentary
discussions kept on hold, or (one might say) forgotten in some drawer. In fact,
there was only one date (12 December 2006) in our nine-year sample when a pardon
proposal was turned down by vote.13
While “good news” might translate into immediate changes in expectations (the
negative event times), in the absence of “bad news” a smooth increase in suicides
following the end of a wave of proposals is the evidence one would expect as hopes
of freedom are being shattered.
As a preliminary placebo tests, Figure 4 shows that for the same period of four
months before and four months after the event time, no relationship emerges between
proposals and natural deaths in prison.14
12Such spacing is determined by the typical spacing between waves of proposals.
13One observation is far from enough to perform any meaningful statistical test (although there
is a significant increase in suicides immediately after that date).
14Again, to smooth the monthly averages (the vertical bars) a local polynomial regression (de-
picted by the dashed line in the figure) shows now no evidence of any relation between deaths from
natural causes and the ongoing parliamentary activity.
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Based on Figure 3, another way to present the evidence is to relate suicides
to proposals presented in previous months. In order to take potential seasonal
components into account, Figure 5 presents the average suicide rate by each month
of the year - for instance, the average suicide rate following January across our 10-
year sample. In doing so, we restrict attention moreover at whether there were any
legislative proposals during the month that precedes the one in which the suicide
takes place so as to avoid any reverse causality, in the sense that members of congress
may be more likely to propose collective pardons when suicide rates are particularly
high.15
The results of this approach are depicted in Figure 5. Namely, for a given month
of the year, the suicide rate for that month is lower if the month was preceded by
legislative proposals than when no pardon proposals have been made in the preceding
month. As an observation, this refers to any month of the year but February, March,
April, September, and November - these five months are not included in the figure
because no pardon proposals were ever made in our sample in any of these months.
As a rule, this evidence applies across the years in our sample with only one
exemption, August 2006. If we were to include this month in our analysis, the
August suicide rate when pardon proposals occurred in July would be higher across
the sample than the suicide rate in August when no pardons have been proposed in
July. Of course, the August in question is a very peculiar August. On 1 August 2006,
a pardon proposal succeeded into actually becoming law - the only time this occurs
15Of course, it could be argued that one month is not long enough a period to rule out contem-
poraneous relations that may be driving the observed correlation between pardon proposals and
changes in suicide rates. Indeed, one could surmise that current poor living conditions in prisons
(for instance, due to over-crowding or budgetary problems) force inmates to end their lives, and
subsequently legislators to propose collective sentence reductions. Under this hypothesis, however,
the implied correlation between pardon proposals and changes in suicide rates ought to be positive,
not negative as in the data.
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during the period under investigation. And it could well be that the discrepancy
this particular month is causing on the August suicide rates in our sample are driven
by the suicides of inmates who did not receive a sentence reduction on 1 August
2006. In fact, this category of prisoners had to cope not only with the psychological
burden of seeing their fellow inmates released or soon to be released (which would
be in line with evidence on relative comparisons, as in Daly et al., 2013), but also
with the historical regularity that following an actual pardon the next one might be
a decade or more away.
Evidently from Figure 5, for each and every of the seven months shown in the fig-
ure and across the years in our sample, the monthly suicide rate when pardons have
been proposed during the preceding month is lower than when no such legislative
proposals were made. While this already attests to an apparently significant , that
appears to be significant (the likelihood of getting seven “downs” out of seven inde-
pendent Bernoulli “up-down” trials using a fair coin is only 0.57 = 0.008) negative
relation between pardon proposals in the Italian parliament and suicides in Italian
prisons, in what follows we will investigate this rigorously by means of regression
analysis.
Before proceeding, however, and as a preliminary placebo test, we can check
that there is no apparent relation between pardon proposals and the death rate
amongst inmates from causes other than suicides.16 To this end, Figure 6 depicts
the monthly death rate in Italian prisons from natural causes, categorizing again
the data by whether there were legislative proposals during the preceding month,
and excluding again the August 2006 observation.
16One might consider comparisons of the pardon proposals with the national suicide rate in
Italy, or the suicide rate amongst Italian men, as another placebo test. Prisons being isolated
environments, however, the power of such tests is bound to be inadequately small.
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Our comparisons here refer to any given month of the year across our sample
but for the months January, June, and December - as there were no deaths from
naturals or unknown causes in our sample in any of these months when at least one
pardon proposal was made during the respective preceding month. As opposed to
our observations for the suicide rates, there seems to be no clearly obvious pattern
between pardon proposals and deaths from causes other than suicides - in fact, the
monthly death rates for May and July are now significantly higher when pardons
have been proposed during the preceding month than when no legislative proposals
were made. To put it more formally, the hypothesis that the observed relation
between pardon proposals and death rates from natural or other causes is due to
independent Bernoulli “up-down” trials using a fair coin cannot be rejected.
5 Regression Analysis
Needless to say, claiming descriptive evidence of a relationship between pardon pro-
posals and changes in suicide rates assumes at a minimum that inmates do follow the
parliamentary activity on pardons from within the prison confines. Of course, in the
absence of any evidence that suicides respond to pardon proposals, one would not
be able to rule out that inmates do not or cannot follow parliamentary activity. By
contrast, the fact that such evidence seems to exist implies that inmates do follow
the parliamentary activity on pardons, at least on average. Nonetheless, this is an
assumption and, as such, it needs to be checked.
To this end, we looked at the distribution of articles that appeared on two of the
main Italian newspapers, Il Corriere della Sera and La Stampa, and found that in 75
percent of the weeks in which a pardon proposal was introduced in parliament one
or more articles dedicated to pardons appeared in press, a likelihood that drops to
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less than 20 percent for the weeks without proposals.17 Furthermore, conversations
with Francesco Morelli and Riccardo Arena, the respective directors of the monthly
prison magazine Ristretti Orizzonti and the weekly prison radio program Radio
Carcere, revealed that inmates are well aware about the legislative proposals while
news inside prisons tend to travel very fast by word of mouth.18 Unfortunately, we
could not find any hard evidence on these claims, other than the fact that Ristretti
Orizzonti ’s website has about 4,000 unique visits per day.
5.1 Benchmark Results
Given that we have only anecdotal evidence about how information flows into pris-
ons, we proceed with the deployment of regression analysis to test whether pardon
proposals lead to significant differences in suicide rates. Since legislative proposals
are bound to be orthogonal to any individual characteristic that might affect an in-
mate’s suicidal behavior, parsimonious regression specifications are sufficient. Table
3 presents the estimates of different Poisson regressions, the exposure variable being
prison population (which in Italy is measured by semi-annual census).19 We aggre-
gate the data by month to reduce the variability in suicides and regress the total
number of suicides on the number of proposals presented in previous months. Given
the presence of seasonality in suicidal behavior, each regression includes monthly
fixed effects. To account, moreover, for the fact that the actual pardon in August
2006 might be “bad news” for those inmates who did not receive a sentence re-
17The articles in question are freely available on the journals’ respective websites (www.corriere.it
and www.lastampa.com).
18Ristretti Orizzonti (Limited Horizons) was established in 1998 while Radio Carcere (Radio
Prison) has been broadcasted since 2002 by Radio Radicale (Radical Radio), a well-known Italian
radio station.
19The expected number of suicides in month t is given by E [yt|xt] = Pe
θ⊺xt , where P repre-
sents the prison population and xt the array of pardon proposals in the preceding months. The
coefficients can be interpreted as simple semi-elasticities: θi = E [yt|xt]
−1 ∂E[yt|xt]
∂xit
.
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duction, each regression includes also a dummy equal to one for August 2006. Its
coefficient is always significant and approximately equal to two. That is, amongst
those inmates who had to remain behind bars while nearly 20,000 of their fellow
inmates were released following the amnesty law of August 2006, suicide rates were
200 percent higher than expected, despite a reduced overcrowding!
We do restrict attention to the pardon proposals presented in the preceding
months. The use of such lags reduces the concern of reverse causality which would
bias the estimated coefficient upwards. It accounts also for the possibility that it
might take on average several days for the information about legislative proposals
to reach all inmates. Column 1 of Table 3 controls for pardon proposals presented
up to 3 months earlier (t − 3), while each of following columns tests the exclusion
of the last lag using the Akaike Information Criterium. The latter suggests the last
column as the preferred specification - indeed, for all but the immediately-preceding
month the lags correspond to coefficients that are very close to zero in terms of value
and not different from zero in terms of statistical significance.
The first row of Table 3 indicates also that each pardon proposal in the previous
month reduces the number of suicides by between 7.5 and 8 percent. Each column
of the table presents also the p-value of an overdispersion likelihood-ratio test that
compares the Poisson model to the Negative Binomial one. The latter regression
approach might seem as an even more natural benchmark, being at least more flexi-
ble as it relaxes the assumption that the conditional variance equals the conditional
mean. Yet, none of the specifications allows us to reject the Poisson model in favor of
the Negative Binomial one. Indeed, under either regression approach, the estimated
dispersion parameter is always very close to zero, while the estimated coefficients
are almost identical between the two models.
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Conditional on proposals presented in the previous month the ones presented
before do not seem to matter.20 This evidence is fully in line with our previous
event study (see Figure 3). What seems to matter for inmates are signals that the
legislative process is progressing, meaning that in the previous period proposals have
been presented.
Following the same informational logic, conditional on the proposals presented fu-
ture proposals should not influence the suicides rate (unless proposals are presented
to reduce the number of suicides). Table 4 tests this prediction using proposals pre-
sented up to 3 months after the suicides. There is no evidence that future proposals
influence current suicide rates.21
5.2 Difference in Differences Results
The evidence of a relationship between pardon proposals and suicide rates appears
not only descriptive, nevertheless it could be that the observed correlation is driven
by some other underlying factor to which both pardon proposals and suicides in
prison respond. Of course, the first such factor that comes to mind has to do with
living conditions in prisons - in particular, overcrowding. And this is precisely the
story behind the central claim of the present paper. For if pardon proposals are the
product of severe problems with living conditions in prisons, the resulting reduction
in suicides rates cannot but be due to the inmates’ improved expectations about
their future living conditions.
Another factor, however, could be that, for some reason, pardon proposals in the
20They matter more if one did not control for the subsequent ones. Results are available upon
request.
21Adding the potentially endogenous present number of proposals to the analysis does not alter
the results, and the coefficient on the present number of proposals is negative and close to being
significant. Given that the proposals presented in the same month that suicides are recorded are
potentially endogenous we prefer to exclude them from the regressions.
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Italian parliament are decreasing the levels of violence inside Italian prisons, so that
suicides in prisons might not be the product of forward-looking considerations, but
of the resulting reduced levels of violence. With respect to this hypothesis, recall
that we also have information on deaths related to causes other than suicides. Our
next identification strategy, therefore, is going to exploit information on the number
of deaths that are supposedly due to natural causes (using a difference in difference
procedure). Instead of the suicide rate being our dependent variable, we will use
now the difference in the monthly death rates (per 10,000 inmates) from suicides
and natural causes. Table 5 presents difference-in-differences regression results.22
Since the differences in question take both positive and negative values, we deploy
estimation by ordinary least squares, controlling again for the August 2006 amnesty
law dummy and for monthly fixed effects.23
As shown by columns (1)-(3) of the table, following more legislative proposals
in the preceding month, there are consistently fewer suicides in the current month,
as compared to natural deaths. The corresponding regressions deploy three, two,
and one lag: only proposals introduced in the immediately preceding month have a
significant effect in lowering the difference in the respective death rates.
The coefficients in Table 5 are around 5 percent, meaning that the typical pro-
posal is associated on average and in the short run with 0.05 fewer suicides per
month per 10,000 inmates than deaths by natural causes.
Given that on average there are 0.72 per 10,000 inmates suicides every month, in
relative terms, the negative effect on the suicide rate is close to 7 percent, and thus
22Unfortunately, our data does not permit a finer categorization of the other causes of death.
Needless to say, had this been possible (for example, into violence, health problems, infectious
diseases, etc.), it would allow for a more thorough investigation.
23Estimating a Poisson regression controlling for the number of deaths from natural causes leads
to the same results.
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comparable to the Poisson estimates above. Given that there are about 60 suicides
a year, on yearly basis this translates in four saved lives. Since we are dealing with
changes in expectations that are notoriously hard to measure, and since this is the
first study to directly test such forward-looking behavior in suicides, it is difficult to
judge the size of the estimate.
5.3 Political Heterogeneity of the Effects
Overall, our analysis is quite conclusive that the typical pardon proposal tends to
be associated with a reduction in the suicide rate, but not in the rates of death due
to other causes. Yet, it may well be that not all legislative proposals are equally
powerful signals in inducing inmates to adjust their expectations about the likelihood
of an amnesty law.
It should be noted, in particular, that for a pardon proposal to become amnesty
law an absolute parliamentary majority of two-thirds is required. As a consequence,
the pardon proposals that are put forward by parliamentary members of the largest
political parties could be more important signals than those proposals which are
presented by members of parliament who belong to minor parties. The results
reported in Column 1 of Table 6 suggest that this is indeed the case, despite the
lack of statistical significance. Proposals presented by politicians who belong to
the major parties (namely, the 9 proposals presented by members of ULIVO, the
main center-left party at the time, and the 12 proposals put forward by members
of FORZA ITALIA, the main center-right party at the time) do carry more weight
than the ones presented by the remaining minor parties.
Given that an absolute parliamentary majority is required for a pardon proposal
to become amnesty law, restricting attention also to whether or not a given pardon
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proposal is made by a politician belonging to the governing parliamentary majority
refers to another partition of the Italian parliament that may as well matter for
signalling. In this sense, Column 2 of Table 6 indicates that proposals put forward
by members of the parliamentary opposition carry more weight, a result in line with
the very fact that, throughout the period under consideration here, the required
absolute majority of two thirds had been impossible for the governing parliamentary
majority to achieve on its own.
Yet another determinant of the relation between a given legislative pardon pro-
posal and its power in signalling the likelihood of an amnesty law has to do with the
“credibility” of the politician who puts it forward. Indeed, as in any signalling model
the receiver’s belief-updating rule is bound to depend on the sender’s credibility (see
DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010, for an overview on persuasion in economics), the
inmates’ inferences on the likelihood of success of a given pardon proposal will de-
pend on what they know about the proposer.
To frame the issue more precisely, the question here is whether proposals pre-
sented in parliament by politicians with a long record of such proposals (measured by
the total number of pardon proposals they have put forward) induce fewer changes
in suicides than proposals by members of parliament without a reputation for such
initiatives.24 To this end, the final column of Table 6 shows that pardon propos-
als originating from members of parliament with more than 3 such proposals under
their belt (which corresponds to 46 percent of the total number of pardon proposals)
tend to reduce suicides in prisons by less than the proposals that are initiated by
members with track record of fewer than 3 proposals.
24For example, between 2000 and 2006, Marco Boato of the Partito Radicale introduced 11
pardon proposals. The corresponding frequency, on average almost two proposals per annum,
coupled with the subsequent failures to reach the required parliamentary approval, might reduce
significantly the value of a given proposal as a signal that an amnesty law is more likely.
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5.4 Robustness Checks
It remains to examine the robustness of the preceding analysis. To this end, Table
7 presents several checks. Columns 1 and 2 show our two benchmark regressions:
the Poisson one and that based on the most conservative difference-in-differences
specification, respectively. The latter refers to the difference between the rate of
suicides and the death rate from other causes, as been depicted by Columns 5-6
of Table 5. Year fixed effects are added in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7. In these
specifications, the identification is based only on the differences in pardon proposals
across months within each year. Compared to the first two columns of the table, the
results now change a little. The Poisson coefficient goes from -8 to -7 percent, and
its significance falls from the 5 to the 10 percent level. By contrast, the difference-in-
differences coefficient increases from -5.8 to -8.6 percent, while its significance rises
from the 10 to the 5 percent level.
Equally small changes are obtained also if one does not control for exposure
in the Poisson model. This is shown by Column 5 of Table 7 while its last two
columns depict another important robustness check. This consists of including past
suicide rates (Column 6) or past differences between suicides and death rates from
other causes (Column 7), so as to control for reverse causality. More precisely,
if past suicide rates were correlated with past proposals, the coefficient on past
proposals might just capture autocorrelation between present and past suicide rates.
However, this does not seem to be the case. The autoregressive coefficient is precisely
estimated as being close to zero while the coefficient on past proposals is only slightly
lower than before.
Finally, the estimated coefficients of interest become only slightly larger when
we restrict attention to those years in which most of the proposals were presented
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(2002-2006). The pertinent results are shown in Table 8 whose first two rows refer to
the corresponding contemporaneous relations. These are based upon the assumption
that the effects of pardon proposals on suicide rates materialize within the month
that follows a proposal.
Nonetheless, to account also for the possibility that it takes longer for the news
about legislative proposals to reach the prison confines and induce inmates to adjust
their expectations, the subsequent rows of Table 8 introduce expectation proxies that
are based on the average number of proposals in the preceding 2, 3, or 4 months.
The largest effect (10.9 percent reduction in the suicide rate per proposal) obtains
when we use a lag of 3 months to measure expectations, but the differences are small
overall. And as before, the Akaike Information Criterion favors the specification that
restricts attention to the immediately-preceding month.
6 Concluding Remarks
Clearly, by falling on average when the legislature proposes new pardons, suicide
rates in Italian prisons do respond to changes in expectations about future condi-
tions. Pardon proposals constitute “good news” for the inmates, who might expect
reductions in their length of sentence, but also improvements in their living condi-
tions via an alleviation of over-crowding in prisons. Overall, our analysis provides
evidence of forward-looking behavior in the decision to not commit suicide, and in
this sense our findings are consistent with two different strands of the literature: the
one on the rationality of suicides, and that on the rationality of criminals (Becker,
1992, see, for example,).
To arrive at this conclusion, we exploited variations in inmates’ expectations
as measured by legislative proposals for collective pardons. Methodologically, our
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main underlying assumptions have been that (i) actual amnesty laws are preceded
by several pardon proposals, (ii) inmates follow the respective parliamentary activ-
ity, and (iii) all this modifies their expectations about the likelihood of an actual
amnesty law. With respect to assumptions (i)-(ii), we provided evidence in support
of the first and showed that the second can be defended on the basis that national
newspapers, a prison magazine, and a weekly radio program devoted to life in prison
cover parliamentary activity on pardon proposals extensively.
Regarding assumption (iii), the precision of our measure of changes in expec-
tations is hardly verifiable, and prone to error. For example, inmates might not
get immediately informed about a given proposal, or have additional information
about its likelihood of turning into amnesty law. Given that we do not have data
on the underlying heterogeneity in expectations, we undertook several robustness
checks and tried different ways in our treatment of pardon proposals with respect to
their origin (in time, but also in parliament). Overall, our analysis points towards a
significant and rather quick adjustment in inmates’ expectations about their future
in prison following legislative pardon proposals.
Of course, the adjusted expectations in question might not have to do solely with
a new date of release. Perhaps the hope of early release makes family re-engage or
engage more with prisoners (and, thus, affect them psychologically for the better), or
independently improve the psychology and moral in prison, turning it temporarily
into a less unpleasant place. In either case, however, pardon proposals ought to
be “good news” for those behind bars, and the presence of any rationality in their
decision to commit or not suicide should force them to respond accordingly.
Unless a pardon proposal turns at some point from “good news” into “bad news,”
crushing inmates’ hopes. This ought to become the case as time passes without the
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proposal being turned into an actual pardon. What matters then would be the
net effect of pardon proposals on inmates’ expectations. For example, under certain
types of preferences, such as habit-formation or loss-aversion, more pardon proposals
could lead to an increase in suicides as agents prefer no news to a variety of good
and bad ones.
Needless to say, ultimately, whether the net effect of pardon proposals on in-
mates’ expectations is positive or negative cannot be but an empirical question.
And, unfortunately, there is no readily available measure of “bad news.”
The above considerations notwithstanding, given the noise that pardon proposals
entail as signals of future amnesty laws, our analysis agrees broadly with the option
value theory of rational suicides. The latter predicts that the value of postponing
a suicide should increase when the uncertainty about future conditions increases.
In this sense, our results indicate that suicides in Italian prisons would probably
be higher if there were no amnesty laws, even if these were to be replaced by a
mean-preserving reduction in the variability of the length of sentence.
Yet, this is far from saying that pardons should be used as policy instruments
to reduce suicides in prisons. Even though by all means a central policy question, if
amnesties are to be treated more seriously than simple ad hoc measures to reduce
overcrowding in prisons, the relevant cost-benefit analysis is beyond the reach of
the present study. We do not have the required data to estimate parameters such
as the number of lives saved per year of sentence pardoned, the potential crimes
that criminals released ahead of schedule might commit, or the corresponding social
benefits and costs.
It is equally hard to draw conclusions regarding the effect of fewer or more
pardon proposals. Obviously, if the proposals were to be increased without altering
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the number of actual pardons, the perceived impact of the typical proposal on one’s
expectation about the likelihood of an amnesty law should diminish. In the absence,
therefore, of the necessary data to estimate in any meaningful sense the size of
the effect proposals exert on the likelihood of an actual pardon (and, in turn, on
the suicide rate in prison), the present paper has little to say in terms of policy
implications or recommendations.
Our scope is limited into establishing that the decision to not commit suicide in
prison includes at a minimum some rational component: expectations about future
conditions do play a role, and do respond to relevant public information. And in
this sense, ours ought to be a conservative test of rationality in suicides. For given
that criminals are often viewed as boundedly-rational or even irrational individuals,
if anything, our estimates ought to be biased toward zero.
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Figure 1: Legislative Proposals and Laws
Note The vertical lines indicate the passing of the laws, squares indicate the number of pardon
proposals.
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Figure 4: Cumulative-Peak Proposals and
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Note: In either figure, the event time (in months) is centered around the month where an
uninterrupted monthly series of pardon proposals ends. The dashed line represents a local
polynomial regression with a bandwidth of one month. The vertical bars (squares) indicate the
average number of suicides (pardon proposals) per month.
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Table 1: The Distribution of Prison Population by Type of Crime Before/After the
August 2006 Pardon.
July 2006 rank September 2006 rank % Reduction
Crimes against wealth 0.309 1 0.277 1 -0.43
Crimes against persons 0.149 2 0.167 2 -0.29
Drug related crimes 0.146 3 0.166 3 -0.28
Illegal possession of weapons 0.141 4 0.144 4 -0.36
Public trust 0.048 5 0.041 5 -0.46
Crimes against the public administration 0.038 6 0.032 7 -0.47
Crimes against the justice department 0.034 7 0.027 8 -0.50
Third book of administrative sanctions 0.025 8 0.025 9 -0.37
Mafia related crimes 0.025 9 0.033 6 -0.17
Other crimes 0.085 . 0.088 . -0.35
Total 1 . 1 -0.37
Total number of prisoners 60,710 38,326
Based on DAP (2006). The last column depicts the percentage change in the number of prisoners
by main crime typology.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Natural deaths 1.544 1.476
Suicides 4.158 2.18
Proposals
Total 0.5 1.766
by major parties 0.105 0.570
by minor parties 0.342 1.977
by congressmen/women who pre-
sented fewer than 3 proposals
0.211 0.867
by congressmen/women who pre-
sented more than 3 proposals
0.237 1.897
by majority 0.175 0.823
by minority 0.272 1.441
N 114
The political variables that define the proposals are not fully balanced
with the respect to the total number of proposals.
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Table 3: The Effect of Past Pardon Proposals on Suicide
Rates
(1) (2) (3)
Suicide rate
Number of proposals (t− 1) -0.0753** -0.0764** -0.0802**
(0.0295) (0.0310) (0.0321)
Number of proposals (t− 2) -0.0192 -0.0276
(0.0202) (0.0180)
Number of proposals (t− 3) -0.0269
(0.0190)
2006 Pardon (0/1) 2.336*** 2.249*** 2.118***
(0.470) (0.473) (0.484)
Pseudo R2 0.0393 0.0383 0.0343
AIC 493.31 494.97 498.47
p-vale overdispersion 0.5 0.5 0.5
Observations 111 112 113
Each column represents a different Poisson regression. The prison
population measures the exposure: E [yt|xt] = Pe
θ⊺xt , where P is
the prison population, xt depicts proposals in each of the preceding
months, while θ corresponds to semi-elasticities. All regressions
control for prison population and monthly fixed effects. The p-value
refers to an overdispersion likelihood-ratio test that compares the
Poisson model to the Negative Binomial model. Robust standard
errors are shown in parentheses. Levels of significance are shown at
10 percent (*), 5 percent (**), and 1 percent (***).
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Table 4: The Effect of Past and Future Pardon Proposals
on Suicide Rates
(1) (2) (3)
Suicide rate
Number of proposals (t+ 3) 0.0104
(0.0337)
Number of proposals (t+ 2) -0.0146 -0.0113
(0.0287) (0.0240)
Number of proposals (t+ 1) 0.00744 0.00925 0.00431
(0.0221) (0.0218) (0.0203)
Number of proposals (t− 1) -0.0911** -0.0924*** -0.0886**
(0.0354) (0.0355) (0.0358)
Pseudo R2 0.0393 0.0388 0.0371
Observations 110 111 112
Each column represents a different Poisson regression. The prison
population measures the exposure: E [yt|xt] = Pe
θ⊺xt , where P is
the prison population, xt depicts proposals in each of the preceding
months, while θ corresponds to semi-elasticities. All regressions
control for prison population and monthly fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are shown in parentheses. Levels of significance are
shown at 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**), and 1 percent (***).
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Table 5: Difference in Difference Estimates of The Effect of Pardon
Proposals
(1) (2) (3)
Suicides-Natural cause per 10,000 inmates
Number of proposals (t− 1) -0.0509** -0.0490** -0.0479**
(0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0213)
Number of proposals (t− 2) 0.00854 0.00694
(0.0165) (0.0138)
Number of proposals (t− 3) -0.00654
(0.0140)
August 2006 Pardon (0/1) 1.856*** 1.802*** 1.833***
(0.325) (0.324) (0.309)
Observations 111 112 113
R-squared 0.171 0.166 0.171
Each column represents a different linear regression estimated by OLS. All
regressions control for monthly fixed effects. Robust standard errors are shown in
parentheses. Levels of significance are shown at 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**), and
1 percent (***).
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Table 6: Political Heterogeneity of the Effect of Pardon Proposals on
Suicide Rates
(1) (2) (3)
Suicide rate
Number of proposals:
by minor parties -0.0429
(0.0438)
by major parties -0.145
(0.0881)
by minority -0.137*
(0.0709)
by majority -0.0216
(0.0601)
by congressmen/women who presented -0.109**
fewer than 3 proposals (0.0499)
by congressmen/women who presented 0.00774
3 or more proposals (0.128)
August 2006 Pardon (0/1) 1.506 2.640* 0.326
(1.430) (1.468) (3.359)
Observations 113 113 113
Each column represents a different Poisson regression. The prison population
measures the exposure: E [yt|xt] = Pe
θ⊺xt , where P is the prison population, xt
depicts proposals in each of the preceding months, while θ corresponds to
semi-elasticities. All regressions control for prison population and monthly fixed
effects. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Levels of significance are shown
at 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**), and 1 percent (***).
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Table 7: Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Benchmark With year fixed effects No exposure Dynamic regresion
Poisson DinD Poisson DinD Poisson Poisson DinD
Number of proposals (t− 1) -0.0802** -0.0479** -0.0703* -0.0590** -0.0924** -0.0768* -0.0494**
(0.0321) (0.0213) (0.0362) (0.0281) (0.0377) (0.0463) (0.0212)
August 2006 Pardon 2.118*** 1.833*** 1.893*** 1.802*** 1.885*** 2.131*** 1.824***
(0.484) (0.309) (0.497) (0.378) (0.558) (0.779) (0.313)
Lagged dependent var. 0.0140 -0.0497
(0.0225) (0.106)
Observations 113 113 113 113 113 113 113
R-squared 0.171 0.249 0.173
All but in Column (5) we control for prison population. All regressions control for monthly fixed effects. Robust standard errors are shown
in parentheses. Levels of significance are shown at 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**), and 1 percent (***).
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Table 8: The Effect of Pardon Proposals on Suicide Rates
Measure of proposals Sample β SE AIC Obs.
(1) Last month Full -0.0802** (0.0321) 498.47 113
(2) Last month 2002-2006 -0.110*** (0.0373) 254.32 59
(3) Last two months Full -0.0979*** (0.0351) 493.49 112
(4) Last two months 2002-2006 -0.126*** (0.0458) 250.88 58
(5) Last three months Full -0.109*** (0.0399) 490.16 111
(6) Last three months 2002-2006 -0.138*** (0.0525) 247.95 57
(7) Last four months Full -0.0762* (0.0397) 488.24 110
(8) Last four months 2002-2006 -0.0882* (0.0519) 248.23 56
Each row represents a different Poisson regression. The prison population measures the
exposure: E [yt|xt] = Pe
θ⊺xt , where P is the prison population, xt depicts proposals in each
of the preceding months, while θ corresponds to semi-elasticities. All regressions control for
prison population and monthly fixed effects. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Levels of significance are shown at 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**), and 1 percent (***).
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